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CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD
OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

ISSUE:
ONE OF THE LIKELY DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS,
MR. IENG SARY, RECEIVED A PARDON BY THE KING OF CAMBODIA IN RELATION
TO HIS 1979 CONVICTION FOR GENOCIDE. THE U.N. AND CAMBODIA HAVE
AGREED THAT THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS SHOULD DECIDE THE SCOPE
OF THIS PARDON. UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENT, TO WHAT
CRITERIA SHOULD THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS LOOK IN DECIDING THIS
ISSUE?

Prepared by Conor McLaughlin
Fall 2006
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*
Ieng Sary, the foreign minister of the Khmer Rouge regime, received a royal pardon in
1996 from King Sihanouk in relation to his 1979 genocide conviction before the People’s
Revolutionary Tribunal.1 In addition, the King granted Sary a limited amnesty from prosecution
under the Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group.2 This memorandum discusses the
circumstances of the Royal Decree and the criteria the Extraordinary Chambers should consider
when deciding the validity and applicability of the pardon and amnesty.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The purpose of this memorandum is to develop a list of criteria to which the
Extraordinary Chambers can look to decide if it should give legal effect to Ieng Sary’s pardon
and amnesty. That is, the ultimate question is whether the pardon and amnesty are valid. After a
careful examination and analysis of the facts relevant to the issue, the author concludes that Ieng
Sary’s amnesty is legitimate and the Extraordinary Chambers should abide by it. The pardon,
however, is not legitimate and the Extraordinary Chambers should disregard it as contrary to
international law.

* One of the likely defendants before the Extraordinary Chambers, Mr. Ieng Sary, received a

pardon by the King of Cambodia in relation to his 1979 conviction for genocide. The U.N. and
Cambodia have agreed that the Extraordinary Chambers should decide the scope of this pardon.
Under international law and precedent, to what criteria should the Extraordinary Chambers look
in deciding this issue?
1

Royal Decree, unofficial English translation of the pardon of Ieng Sary,
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/pardon%20for%20ieng%20sary.pdf, accessed September
25, 2006 [hereinafter Royal Decree][reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43]; see also
Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal on Trial, 186 Mil. L.
Rev. 164, 181 (Winter 2005)[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
2

Royal Decree [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

1

Pardons and amnesties are not the same type of immunity provision. An amnesty occurs
when a sovereign power shields a person or a group from criminal prosecution for past acts.3 A
government issues a pardon, however, after a court convicts a defendant at a criminal trial.4
Thus, a pardon is backward looking, after a conviction, while an amnesty is forward looking,
before a criminal trial. Though pardons and amnesties are distinct acts, this memorandum
attempts to deal with them similarly wherever possible.
1. The Criteria for an effective amnesty or pardon for serious crimes
To aid the Extraordinary Chambers, the author submits that the following six criteria are
essential in determining the validity of an amnesty or pardon in international law:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

governments should not give wholesale amnesties/pardons, but deal with
individuals;
a democratically elected legislature should vote on and approve an
amnesty/pardon;
no outgoing leader should give himself or herself immunity without the
approval of independent parties;
the state granting the amnesty should receive some important benefit in return,
keeping in mind the interests of the victims;
the amnesty/pardon should not prevent the discovery of the truth or
completely stifle retribution for the victims; and
there cannot ever be an amnesty/pardon for genocide, war crimes, or crime
against humanity.

The above list is not exhaustive. Decision-makers should evaluate other factors before coming
to a conclusion about a given set of circumstances. Every situation is different and calls for a
particularized analysis, but the author suggests that the six criteria are universal and applicable to
all situations.
3

Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 507, 508 (1999) [hereinafter referred to as Scharf ICC][reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
4

Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles
of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 Va. J. Int’l. L. 173, 235 (Fall
2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

2

a. Granters must deal with individuals and not give widespread amnesties or
pardons.
Widespread immunity provisions for a group of people prevent a state from examining
each person individually and determining whether that person deserves immunity.

The

international community has recently seen a distinct shift from wholesale amnesties to limited or
conditional amnesties.5 A legitimate amnesty should take into account the particular facts and
circumstances of the individual. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
serves as a prominent example of effective individualized amnesties.6
By their very nature, pardons are given to individuals. A ruling authority grants a pardon
after a trial and conviction.7

Therefore, that ruling authority must take into account the

individual facts of the person receiving the pardon.
b. A democratically elected legislature should vote on or ratify the amnesty or
pardon.
Traditionally, a king could independently pardon a criminal because a crime was an
offense against the king.8 That traditional formulation does not apply in democracies because, in
a democracy, a crime is an offense against the people as a whole.9 Since the people are the true
victims of crimes, especially pervasive crimes, the people must decide whether to offer impunity
for those crimes.

5

Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National
Reconciliation: The U.N. Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 A.J.I.L. 952, 954 (October 2001)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
6

Scharf ICC, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. at 510 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

7

Slye, 43 Va. J. Int’l. L. at 237 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

8

Id. at 236.

9

Id.

3

This same logic applies to amnesties. Politically given amnesties that do not have the
ratification of the people may cause a state to descend deeper into chaos rather than move toward
peace and stability.10 Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated
that only a state’s democratic institutions – usually the legislature – can determine the validity
and scope of an amnesty provision.11 Thus, the people should ratify any immunity provisions for
widespread crimes before those provisions have legal effect.
c. No amnesty or pardon should be self-given.
Self-given amnesties for human rights violations cannot have any legal validity.12 There
is an obvious conflict of interest when an outgoing regime gives itself immunity from
prosecution for crimes it has committed. Moreover, self-given amnesties will serve as a strong
example to other unscrupulous regimes that they can commit human rights violations and avoid
having to answer for their crimes.13
d. The state granting the amnesty or pardon should receive some tangible,
valuable benefit, which flows to the victims, from the person or group
receiving immunity.
A state should not offer an amnesty or pardon unless it receives a tangible benefit in
return. For example, South Africa required that perpetrators fully disclose their crimes before

10

Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 955, 991
(March 2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

11

The 1985-86 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1986),
Chapter V, p. 2 of 16, available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.5.htm, accessed
November 5, 2006 [hereinafter referred to as the Inter-American Commission
Report][reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
12

Id. at p.2.

13

See generally Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to
Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 11 (Winter 1996) [hereinafter
Scharf Amnesty for Peace][reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

4

they could receive amnesty.14

The victims also received at least a limited amount of

retribution.15 In the context of internal armed conflict, the state may receive the benefit of
having a hostile group cease hostilities against the government. That is, a state benefits by
preventing further bloodshed when it trades impunity for peace.16
e. There needs to be some mechanism for truth finding and at least limited
retribution for the victims.
Every society has a right to know the full truth about past crimes and the circumstances
under which those crimes were committed.17 The specific victims and their families are also
entitled to know the truth in order to facilitate national reconciliation.18 Before a state grants
impunity to perpetrators of persistent crimes, those perpetrators should disclose the truth.
f. There can be no amnesty or pardon for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.
Since World War II, the U.N. has consistently prohibited amnesties for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other serious breaches of international human rights law.19

The

prohibitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are erga omnes, flowing to

14

Stahn, 95 A.J.I.L. at 954-55 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

15

Sam Garkawe, The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Suitable Model to
Enhance the Role and Rights of the Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights?, 27
Melbourne U.L.R. 334, 356-57 (August 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
30].

16

Scharf ICC, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. at 507 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

17

Inter-American Commission Report, p. 2-3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

18

Id. at 3.

19

Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General][reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

5

all.20 That prohibition imposes on all states a duty to punish offenders.21 Offering a perpetrator
of genocide an amnesty or a pardon, for example would violate a state’s obligation to punish that
person.
2. Applying each criterion to Ieng Sary
a. Individuality: King Sihanouk issued the Royal Decree to Ieng Sary only.
King Sihanouk issued the pardon and amnesty to Ieng Sary individually.22 Since the
King tailored the Royal Decree to the particular facts and circumstances of Ieng Sary’s situation,
both the pardon and the amnesty satisfy the first factor.
b. Legislative Approval: King Sihanouk unilaterally issued the Royal Decree.
An official close to the King made the Royal Decree public, and it took legal effect,
before the Cambodian Parliament approved it.23 Thus, the pardon and amnesty both fail this
criterion because the democratically elected Parliament did not ratify it. Hence, the people did
not ratify it.

20

Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction][reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 12].

21

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
adopted by Res.260 (III) A of the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9,
1948, Article II [hereinafter referred to as the Genocide Convention][reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

22

Royal Decree [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

23

Bora Touch, Been Pardoned, but Can Justice Still Stalk Ieng Sary, Khmer Institute (2001),
available at http://www.khmerinstitute.org/articles/art03c.html, accessed October 3, 2006
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

6

c. No self-granting: Ieng Sary did not grant himself amnesty or pardon.
King Sihanouk released the Royal Decree, not Ieng Sary.24 Consequently, both the
amnesty and the pardon satisfy this standard.
d. Benefit to Cambodia: the pardon did not substantially benefit the
Cambodian government or its people, but the amnesty did.
There is some suggestion that the King pardoned Ieng Sary in exchange for him leading a
“mass surrender” of Khmer Rouge partisans hostile to the Cambodian Government.25 Sary,
however, did not offer a disclosure of his involvement in, or knowledge of, the Khmer Rouge
atrocities.

The people of Cambodia did not get the benefit of finding out what actually

happened. Thus, the pardon fails this factor.
In return for the amnesty, however, Ieng Sary ceased to be a member of the Khmer
Rouge. He also led thousands of lower-level Khmer Rouge soldiers to cease hostilities.26 The
Cambodian people thus received the benefit of Sary’s leaving a group that had been hostile to the
people and the government since the Vietnamese deposed it in 1979. Therefore, the amnesty
portion of the Royal Decree satisfies this criterion.
e. Truth telling and retribution: allowing the pardon prevents the victims of the
Khmer Rouge from getting retribution or discovering the whole truth.
The alternative to prosecuting Ieng Sary and others responsible for the Khmer Rouge
atrocities in the Extraordinary Chambers is likely impunity.27 Sary’s 1979 conviction has limited

24

Royal Decree [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

25

The Associated Press, Official: Former Khmer Rouge foreign minister not immune from
prosecution, October 26, 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

26

Id.

27

Dinah PoKempner, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Criticisms and Concerns, Open Society
Justice Initiative, April 18, 2006, available at
7

value in the fact-finding sense because it was not legitimate. Moreover, Sary has not publicly
admitted wrongdoing, so the Cambodian people have not even had a limited amount of
retribution. As a result, the pardon fails this factor.
The amnesty, however, satisfies this element in a limited sense. There is no doubt that
Ieng Sary was a member of the Democratic Kampuchea Group. Prosecuting him for this crime,
then, would not advance the public’s quest to know the truth. Furthermore, one of the purposes
of the Extraordinary Chambers is to provide Cambodian citizens retribution for the actions of the
Khmer Rouge. Those actions include genocide and crimes against humanity. Violating the Law
to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group is most likely not one of the crimes the
Extraordinary Chambers will try.28 Thus, the amnesty satisfies this criterion.
f. No impunity for serious international offences: the King pardoned Ieng Sary
for genocide
Regardless of the fairness of the 1979 trial, one cannot escape the fact that the Royal
Decree pardons Ieng Sary for genocide.29 The pardon, then, violates this factor, which is the
most important one. The amnesty, however, concerns only membership in the Democratic
Kampuchea Group, not genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Therefore, it satisfies
this last and essential criterion.
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g. Conclusion on applicability of the pardon and amnesty
Considering the foregoing analysis, the author concludes that the Extraordinary
Chambers should not consider the pardon valid and can choose to disregard it. Since the pardon
is for genocide, which implicates the one non-derogable factor, it is not necessary to conduct a
totality of the circumstances analysis. Even if one conducts that analysis, however, the pardon
still fails.
On the other hand, the Extraordinary Chambers should consider the amnesty valid. The
amnesty satisfies five of the six criteria; its only significant weakness is that the Cambodian
Parliament did not ratify it before the King announced it and gave it legal effect. Therefore,
under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the amnesty should stand as a valid exercise of
governmental power.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After five years of civil war, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, known as the Khmer
Rouge, seized the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975.30 The Khmer Rouge cut
off the country from the rest of the world and subjected the Cambodian people to forced
relocation, starvation, unlawful murder, forced labor, torture and other cruel and inhumane acts
on an immense scale.31
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SUZANNAH LINTON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA, (2004), 39 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
31

Id.
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In their quest for self-reliance, the Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge regime sought to bring
Cambodia back to “Year Zero” by creating an agrarian society lacking all modernity.32 Because
of his reputation for supporting the downtrodden, Pol Pot was initially warmly welcomed by the
Cambodian people as their new leader.33 That warm welcome quickly died out, however, as Pol
Pot began to implement his plan for the Democratic Kampuchea, the name Pol Pot chose for
Cambodia.34 Ieng Sary not only served as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign
Affairs under Pol Pot during this time,35 but he was also Pol Pot’s brother-in-law and was known
in Khmer Rouge circles as “brother no. 3.”36
According to some authorities, an estimated 20% of the 7.7 million Cambodians, or 1.54
million, lost their lives due to the Khmer Rouge atrocities.37 Other sources opine that at least 1.7
million Cambodians perished under the Khmer Rouge.38 Still other estimates put the death toll at
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the Joint Tribunal in Cambodia, 4 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 549, 552-53 (Spring 2006)
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Initiative at 72, April 18, 2006, available at
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nearly 3 million.39 In any event, what is certain is that the Khmer Rouge brutalized the entire
country for almost four years.
On Christmas Day, 1978, the Vietnamese government invaded Cambodia to oust its onetime allies, the Khmer Rouge.40 By January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese controlled most of the
countryside and the capital, Phnom Penh.41 Several days later, Vietnam established a puppet
regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea – or PRK – in Cambodia.42 Pol Pot and those
allied with him fled into the jungle where they continued to wage war against successive
Cambodian governments for 17 years.43
In August 1979, the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (“PRT”) – a puppet of the
controlling Vietnamese government – tried and convicted Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in absentia for
genocide.44 The court sentenced both defendants to death.45 Neither defendant participated in
the trials in any way, nor did either serve a day in prison because of these convictions.46
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In 1996, the King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, granted Sary a pardon for his crime,
which vacated the sentence of death and confiscation of all his property resulting from the 1979
conviction.47 Moreover, the King granted Sary amnesty from prosecution under the Law to
Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group.48 Currently, Ieng Sary lives in Phnom Penh.49
The Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group of 1994 made it illegal to engage
in or support the activities of the Khmer Rouge, among other things.50 It also had amnesty
provisions benefiting former members of the Khmer Rouge.51 That amnesty did not extend to
Ieng Sary in 1994 because he continued to hold a leadership position in the Khmer Rouge.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The Dichotomy Between Amnesties and Pardons
Amnesty, in the present context, refers to the act of a sovereign power granting immunity
from criminal prosecutions to a person or a group for past acts.52 A Government may issue a
pardon, on the other hand, after a court finds an individual criminally liable for a wrongful act.53
Therefore, a pardon is backward looking, after a conviction, while an amnesty is forward
looking, before a conviction. Unlike amnesties, though, pardons simply remove the penalty for a
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Steve Heder, The Senior Leaders and Those Most Responsible, Open Society Justice Initiative
at 55, April 18, 2006, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=103182,
accessed October 24, 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
50
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crime without disturbing the “accountability and truth functions of justice.”54 Therefore, pardons
decrease or remove punishment, while amnesties prevent punishment and prevent any truth
finding or assignment of accountability. The significant difference is that a pardon happens after
a court finds a perpetrator criminally liable. That is, a court holds the person accountable after a
presentation of the facts. An amnesty, on the other hand, prevents a court from going through
the process of discovering the truth about the crime through a trial.
The two distinct acts, however, have the same operative legal effect in one very important
way – each shields a person from criminal punishment or civil liability in one way or another.55
In the traditional context, amnesty and pardon mean essentially the same thing. The difference is
that governments have traditionally used amnesties in the context of war, whereas pardons
emanate from the power of a king to immunize perpetrators for offenses committed outside of
the context of war.56
Consequently, even though observers sometimes incorrectly discuss pardons and
amnesties interchangeably,57 this memorandum will attempt to deal with Ieng Sary’s pardon and
amnesty similarly and develop a framework that is consistent with both types of immunity
provisions. In situations in which there is a substantial difference between the approach to a
pardon and to an amnesty, the memorandum will highlight which measure is applicable. The
reason this memorandum discusses pardons and amnesties interchangeably in Ieng Sary’s
instance is that the unfairness of his 1979 trial limits its value as a mechanism of assigning
54

Id. at 235-36.
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ANDREAS O’SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, (2002), P. 2
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Id. at 8.
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accountability and discovering the truth. The memorandum will discuss that unfairness in
section III(D)(1).
The 1979 trial did not serve the accountability and truth functions of justice. If the
Cambodians do not know the full truth, and Ieng Sary was not held legitimately accountable,
then the pardon essentially functions like an amnesty. Since Ieng Sary’s trial did not advance
truth finding or accountability, the only function the pardon served was granting Sary immunity
for his crimes. Hence, it is more like a traditional amnesty than a traditional pardon, and the two
separate parts of the Royal Decree become largely interchangeable for the purposes of this
memorandum, attempting to formulate criteria that apply to both.
B. The Historical Development of Amnesties/Pardons
1. The European approach
Rulers have granted “mercy” – or immunity – for past offenses as far back as pharaoh
Ramses II in 1286BC.58 Over time, immunity provisions in the form of amnesty started to
become prominent components in the process of settling conflicts between states.

These

amnesties were indiscriminate, applying to all the actions that occurred during the wars. For
example, the Peace of Westphalia ending the 30 Years War that ravaged Europe had a
widespread immunity provision.59 That provision granted a “perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or
Pardon” to all the participants, and for all the actions that occurred during the war.60 Since that
time, amnesties have regularly been an element of peace settlements after inter-state wars in
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O’SHEA, p. 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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Europe.61 In the 1870’s, with the end of Prussia’s belligerence and its defeat of France in the
Franco-Prussian War, amnesties appeared temporarily to vanish from peace agreements ending
European inter-state conflicts.62 But the absence of amnesties from peace treaties proved to be
short-lived.
World War I saw a re-emergence of amnesties. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918,
between Germany and Russia, contained an amnesty provision.63 Most egregiously, though, was
the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which overrode the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and granted
general amnesty to the Turks for the massacre of the Armenians.64 This treaty did not facilitate
an end to hostilities, because the war was over. The treaty merely immunized the Turks for
political reasons – so that Turkey could act as a buffer between the new Soviet Union and the
West.65
The treaties concluding the Second World War in Europe, however, were devoid of
amnesties for the vanquished.66 In general, the Allies sought to punish those who perpetrated
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Europe.67 In contrast, General Douglas MacArthur
did provide pardons to some Japanese officials sentenced to death by tribunals; he also

61
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Nijmegen (1678); the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697; and the Treaty of Paris of 1763].
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immunized the Emperor of Japan from punishment.68 In European settings though, immunity
provisions fell out of favor, particularly for the serious crimes perpetrated during the Second
World War.
2. The non-European approach
Historically, amnesties at the end of armed conflicts have not been nearly as common
outside of Europe.69 Those treaties that did contain amnesties usually arose out of wars between
a European state and a non-European state.70 Perhaps that is because, until recent times, most
states did not accept that state actors could be held accountable for crimes during armed
conflict.71 Offenders did not need immunity because there was no state that would hold them
accountable. Regardless of the underlying reasons, immunity provisions were not nearly as
common in treaties concluding armed conflict between non-European states.
3. Immunity in the context of civil war
Immunity provisions have been a staple in peace agreements ending internal armed
conflict in all parts of the world. At the conclusion of the American Civil War, for example, the
United States Congress passed two amnesties.72 The first was conditional and the second was
general, but the ultimate conclusion was that Congress granted all but 500 of the Confederate
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leaders complete protection from legal recourse.73 Similarly, the first president of Brazil granted
the rebels in the southern part of that country an amnesty to end that civil war in 1894.74
Unlike inter-state conflicts, treaties concluding intra-state civil wars continued to use
immunity provisions as a prominent tool for facilitating peace.75 The examples of amnesties
used as instruments in post-internal conflict situations in the 20th Century are too numerous to
list. Significantly, Cambodia is one of those examples76 due in part to the amnesty provisions
contained in the Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group.77
Analysis of immunity in civil war contexts, rather than inter-state conflicts, is particularly
relevant to this memorandum, which discusses a conflict that was internal. A key limitation,
however, is that the Extraordinary Chambers has jurisdiction only for offenses that occurred
between April 17, 1975 and January 6, 1979.78 Thus, the Extraordinary Chambers will not
consider offenses that took place during the Cambodian Civil War that preceded the Khmer
Rouge regime taking power or the period after the Vietnamese Army deposed the Khmer Rouge
regime.
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C. The Shift to the Present Day
1. Justifications for amnesties/pardons in armed conflict and transitional situations
The principal arguments in support of amnesties at the end of wars are that they promote
transition, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, and truth.79

Often, governments and the

international community must negotiate with the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against
humanity to end armed conflicts.80

In such cases, “insisting on criminal prosecutions can

prolong the conflict, resulting in more death, destruction, and human suffering.”81 Therefore, the
party seeking peace frequently adopts policies and practices that conflict with legal
accountability in order to accommodate human rights violators.82

Achieving peace and

preventing a conflict from restarting and claiming more lives is certainly a legitimate goal.
Situations may arise where the world must do just that – sacrifice justice in order to realize
peace.83
Observers point out that widespread amnesties also serve the functional aspect of
enhancing social stability in a country embroiled in a transitional period.84 As evidence of the
role of amnesty provisions in promoting social stability one can point to the effect of the
amnesties given at the end of the U.S. Civil War and, more recently, those issued in Argentina
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after the Dirty War, Chile following the tumultuous first five years of Pinochet’s rule, and South
Africa after Apartheid.85 In fact, some commentators take the view that existing law not only
permits, but also encourages general amnesties after non-international armed conflicts.86
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions supports that view by stating that, “At the end of
hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in armed conflict.”87 Consequently, there is strong international
support for extensive amnesty or pardon provisions if they contribute to the social stability of a
country in transition following internal conflict. Commentators generally argue, however, that
governments should use amnesties only as “a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for
extreme situations.”88
2. Impunity is falling out of favor internationally
In spite of the Protocol II position on amnesties, settlements that offer impunity forsake
the interests both of justice and of the victims of a conflict.89 Seeking accountability, on the
other hand, achieves “the goals of retributive and restorative justice,” establishes a record of
truth, punishes those responsible, and brings closure to a conflict.90 In fact, one of the main
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criticisms of amnesty provisions is that, even when coupled with truth and reconciliation
commissions, amnesties tend to retard the search for truth91 and the implementation of
punishment. The argument that impunity is no longer justified for human rights abuses applies
with greater force when one considers that most “of the widely ratified international human
rights conventions contain provisions which may be interpreted to bar the passage of amnesty
laws.”92
A major problem with large-scale amnesty provisions generally is that they serve to
encourage unscrupulous regimes or people and groups in power in other areas of the world to
commit gross human rights abuses.93 A disturbing example of this occurred in World War II.
The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 granted amnesty to the Turks for their massacre of the
Armenians.94 The Allies allowed this because they needed Turkey to act as a buffer against the
newly formed Soviet Union.95 Thus, the Allies’ political considerations trumped justice for the
Armenians.96 The Turkish impunity emboldened Hitler 15 years later, as he reportedly asked,
“Who now remembers the Armenians?”97
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Amnesties not only encourage human rights abuses elsewhere, but also sometimes
increase rather than decrease bloodshed in the conflict in question. In Haiti, for example, outside
powers negotiated the 1993 Governor’s Island Agreement with the leaders of the military coup
that overthrew President Aristide in 1991.98 That agreement contained an amnesty for the
military regime that committed gross human rights violations.99 Unfortunately, there is little
evidence to suggest that the amnesty contributed to political stability of Haiti or prevented future
human rights abuses.100 The Haitian example may suggest that swapping amnesty for peace can
lead to increased violence and future political destabilization.101 In addition, the UN Human
Rights Commission sets forth the proposition that clemency provisions, even when established to
promote national reconciliation and peace, cannot benefit perpetrators of serious crimes under
international law unless a criminal tribunal prosecuted the perpetrators or the victims had civil
recourse.102
There are two distinguishable types of amnesties relevant to this memorandum.
Amnesties given at the end of armed conflicts are legitimate, and possibly even encouraged.103
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Those amnesties are quite different from amnesties related to human rights abuses.104 One can
read the 1949 Geneva Conventions to encourage amnesties for acts that violate national law,
such as participating in hostilities against the government.105

Under that interpretation,

amnesties simply for taking up arms against one’s government do not violate international law.
On the other hand, the Geneva Conventions proscribe amnesties for human rights violations,
even those committed in the context of internal armed struggle.106
One can take a clarifying example of this difference from the American Civil War.
Those Confederate soldiers that benefited from the impunity provisions the U.S. Congress passed
were soldiers who simply fought against the government.107 In contrast, Captain Henry Wirz,
the Confederate officer in charge of the Andersonville prison camp, did not benefit from any
impunity provisions.108 A U.S. court convicted Wirz of offenses against the Union prisoners of
war held at Andersonville and sentenced him to death.109 Wirz’s failure to ensure humane
treatment of the Union prisoners of war violated the laws of war, and was a war crime. Thus,
traditional justifications for universal amnesties for all acts related to internal armed conflict may
not have the soundest basis.
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D. Ieng Sary’s Trial, Pardon and Amnesty
The legitimacy of Ieng Sary’s 1979 trial before the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal
(“PRT”) is open to question on several different grounds.

Whether the trial adhered to

international law standards affects the analysis of the subsequent pardon of that conviction. This
memorandum will discuss the validity of the pardon and amnesty in a later section.
1. The Trial violated international law standards
Analysts today consider the 1979 trials of Ieng Sary and Pol Pot nothing more than
illegitimate show trials.110 The trial violated several international law standards. First, the PRT
tried Sary in absentia. Second, the PRT was not an independent tribunal properly established by
law. Third, the PRT did not afford Sary or Pol Pot the presumption of innocence.
First, the PRT tried Sary in absentia. A trial in absentia violates an accused’s right to be
present during trial111 and confront his accusers.112 Sary did not have the opportunity to hear the
evidence against him, or to cross-examine witnesses, both violations of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).113 Furthermore, the PRT did not even
appoint someone to present a defense for Sary in his absence.114 The PRT should have at least

110

Kelly Dawn Askin, Open Society Justice Initiative at 79, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 41].
111

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, December 16,
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appointed a counsel on Sary’s behalf. Appointing counsel to argue for Sary would not have
cured the 1979 trial of any its defects, but it may have made the trial a little fairer.
Second, the PRT was not a fair and independent judicial body. Defendants have the right
to a fair and public trial conducted by an independent, impartial, and competent judicial body
established by law.115 In contrast, the PRT was a puppet tribunal installed by the occupying
Vietnamese.116

Its creators ignored the prevailing international law standards of the time

regarding the establishment of a court.117 In addition, the PRT showed that it was not an
impartial tribunal through its public releases indicating an extreme bias towards the
defendants.118 The decree establishing the PRT conclusively stated that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary
were guilty of massive criminal offenses before the court heard any evidence.119 Furthermore,
the chair of the PRK Legal Affairs Committee publicly announced – before the trial began – that
Ieng Sary was guilty of the crimes charged and must be punished.120
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Third, the PRT did not grant Sary the presumption of innocence. An accused is entitled
to the presumption of innocence.121 The decree establishing the PRT denounced both Ieng Sary
and Pol Pot.122 Language condemning the defendants functionally assumes their guilt, thus
depriving them of the presumption of innocence.123 Moreover, the PRT’s definition of genocide
was not consistent with the internationally recognized definition.124

The PRT’s definition

included as genocide the forced expulsion of people from cities and villages to do hard labor; the
wiping out of religion; and the destruction of family and social relations, among other things.125
This definition of what constitutes genocide varies considerably from the internationally
recognized definition, which requires the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”126 Besides failing to meet international standards,
the PRT’s definition of genocide had the practical effect of ensuring Sary’s guilt.127
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2. The pardon and amnesty
As stated earlier, in 1994 King Sihanouk pardoned Ieng Sary for his 1979 conviction for
genocide before the Vietnamese created PRT.128 The Royal Decree also granted Sary amnesty
from prosecution under the Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group.129 Therefore, the
amnesty was not for a violation of international law, but for a violation of national law. On the
other hand, the pardon immunized Sary from punishment for genocide, which is an international
law crime. The Extraordinary Chambers must determine the scope of that amnesty and pardon.
3. The Extraordinary Chambers approach to impunity
In negotiations with the Royal Government of Cambodia, the U.N. pushed for a provision
in the resolution establishing the Extraordinary Chambers stating that: (1) the Cambodian
government would not request an amnesty or pardon on behalf of any individual, and (2) that
previous amnesties and pardons would not bar prosecution now.130

In fact, one of U.N.

Secretary General Kofi Annan’s primary objectives was to ensure that past pardons did not
prevent the Extraordinary Chambers from prosecuting those responsible for the Khmer Rouge
atrocities.131 Nevertheless, the final resolution dropped the second part of the formulation,132
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thus leaving it up to the Extraordinary Chambers itself to decide whether it can prosecute Ieng
Sary.
What is particularly troubling about this situation is that current Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen has repeatedly stated that Ieng Sary should not have to face prosecution in the
Extraordinary Chambers.133 It seems, then, that the Extraordinary Chambers may face political
pressure from the executive branch to give effect to the King’s pardon. This memorandum will
not address those specific political concerns, but instead will focus simply on the proposed
universal criteria for determining the validity of amnesties and pardons.
E. Criteria for an Amnesty or Pardon to be Valid
Analyzing both treaties and policy issues, international law scholars generally condemn
impunity laws for human rights violations as contrary to international law.134 In fact, most
human rights conventions contain passages that seem to invalidate amnesty laws.135 The purpose
of this memorandum, however, is to develop criteria that, if met, might make an immunity
provision for serious crimes valid. More minor crimes, such as traditional misdemeanors and
lower-level felonies, do not fall under the following criteria. Governments should have more
leeway to decide how to deal with lesser criminals.
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With that in mind, this memorandum proposes the following six criteria for a valid
pardon or amnesty, which a decision-maker should consider under a totality of the circumstances
approach. The criteria are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

governments should not give wholesale amnesties/pardons, but deal with
individuals;
a democratically elected legislature should vote on and approve an
amnesty/pardon;
no outgoing leader should give himself or herself an amnesty without the
approval of independent parties;
the state granting the amnesty should receive some important benefit in return,
keeping in mind the interests of the victims;
the amnesty/pardon should not prevent the discovery of the truth or
completely stifle retribution for the victims; and
there cannot ever be an amnesty/pardon for genocide, war crimes, or crime
against humanity.

The above list is certainly not exhaustive, as decision-makers should examine as many factors as
possible. Moreover, certain issues may be principally important in some circumstances, and not
as important in other circumstances. The memorandum will now discuss each of the enumerated
criteria in turn.
1. Governments should not give widespread amnesties/pardons, but should deal
with individuals.
In recent years, the international community has seen a clear shift from blanket amnesties
to either limited or conditional amnesties.136 Considering amnesties for individuals instead of
groups as a whole allows the granting state to evaluate the facts and circumstances of each
person’s involvement in the criminal activity. On the other hand, blanket amnesties do not allow
for that individualized treatment.

The concern with extensive amnesty provisions is that

particularly egregious offenders completely escape punishment by being part of a group that as a
whole, given the particular circumstances, may be entitled to at least limited immunity.
136
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Furthermore, giving wholesale amnesties will likely stifle much of the truth finding process
because individuals will have no incentive to tell the truth; if a perpetrator already has immunity,
he will not likely tell the truth about his crimes.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission achieved international
legitimacy for its amnesties partly because it analyzed each perpetrator’s case individually. A
person seeking amnesty had to not only apply for it, but also fully disclose the crimes he or she
committed in relation to apartheid.137 The Commission conducted extensive public hearings and
examined scores of written and oral submissions,138 allowing it to conduct a personalized
investigation. Similarly, because of the sheer numbers of perpetrators,139 Rwanda established a
comparable commission that has a forward-looking scope.140
Pardons are, by their very nature, individualized. A ruling authority issues a pardon after
a trial and conviction.141 Sometimes an offender does not receive a pardon until after she serves
a portion of her sentence.142 Those issuing the pardon thus have an opportunity to assess the
beneficiary of the pardon individually.143 A pardon arises, then, to correct a mistake in the legal
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process, or if the beneficiary provides something useful to the pardoning authority.144 Therefore,
pardons will usually satisfy this criterion.
2. Amnesty/Pardon provisions should emanate from a democratically elected
legislature in the state giving the amnesty.
In traditional monarchies, the king could unilaterally pardon a criminal based on the legal
fiction that a criminal act was an offense against the king himself.145 Thus, the king could decide
independently to pardon someone for an offense of which the king was the victim.146 In a
democracy, however, crimes are offenses against society as a whole, so only the people should
have the authority to issue a pardon.147 The people, after all, are the real victims, especially of
serious and pervasive criminal activity. Since a democratically elected legislature speaks for the
people, a legitimate pardon for serious offenses cannot have the people’s approval unless the
legislature ratifies it.
The same logic applies to amnesties with even more force, because the grant of an
amnesty prevents the holding of a trial to discover the offenses against the people. Political
amnesties that are not democratically adopted from within the state granting them may cause the
state to plunge deeper into chaos, rather than enjoy a period of peace and stability.148 Moreover,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights agrees concluded that only a state’s
democratic institutions – usually the legislature – can determine the validity and scope of an
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amnesty provision.149 The situation in South Africa again serves as an example. In South Africa
the leaders of the majority black population, speaking for the people, decided that adopting
amnesty provisions was a fair price to pay in exchange for a relatively peaceful democratic
transition.150 South Africa’s amnesty provisions would not have worked had the majority black
populace insisted on retribution. Instead, the black population swapped retribution for peace and
stability. Thus, impunity provisions without the support of the people are not likely to succeed in
bringing peace and stability to a state.
Amnesties enacted by democratically elected bodies must still respect the needs of both
society and the victims to know the truth.151 Consequently, when a legislature decides whether
to accept or reject an amnesty provision, it should pay particular attention to society’s need to
discover the truth about the crimes and the perpetrators’ involvement therein.
There are many countries in the world that purport to be democracies, but have nothing
more than elections that are, on their face, farcical. Therefore, this particular criterion may be
difficult to meet because many of the countries in the world do not truly have democratically
elected governments. There may be situations in which these sham democratic legislatures
approve immunity provisions. In such cases, even though the perpetrators receive immunity,
they and their nations would still face international condemnation. As a result, one cannot
assume that, just because a legislature votes for a pardon or amnesty, the people ratify it as well.
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One must look to the manner in which the people of the granting state elect their legislature
before determining if the immunity provision satisfies this factor.
3. The amnesty/pardon cannot be self-given.
Self-amnesties are an affront to the rule of law and the widely held legal principle that
one should not profit from one’s own bad faith.152 The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has stated in several cases that self-granted amnesties, in which an outgoing regime
immunizes itself for abuses, violate the American Convention on Human Rights.153

Latin

America has significant experience with regimes that disregarded human rights then immunize
themselves before relinquishing power.154 As early as 1986, the Inter-American Commission
concluded that a self-amnesty decreed by those responsible for human rights violations could not
have any legal validity.155
It is obviously an extreme conflict of interest if an outgoing leader or regime gives itself
impunity for its crimes. While allowing outgoing regimes to give themselves amnesty may
facilitate a peaceful transition, the world would pay a heavy price. The world community should
not authorize a situation in which leaders who violate human rights decide their own fate. Selfgiven amnesties would serve as an even stronger example for ruthless regimes the world over
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that they can get away with their crimes, especially if the crimes are particularly grave.156
Continuing the argument set forth in the section above, self-granted amnesties also shut the
people out of the decision-making process.
Presumably, however, a situation may arise in which an outgoing regime proposes that it
should have immunity, without the immunity having legal effect. If the people then genuinely
ratify that proposal, and the proposal satisfies the other criteria, the regime should get immunity.
Since a major goal in this endeavor is to have the people as involved as possible, such a situation
would not run counter to international law or these criteria.
4. The state granting the amnesty or pardon should receive some tangible, valuable
benefit, which flows to the victims, from the person or group receiving
immunity.
The granting state should never give any type of immunity for serious crimes unless it
receives something very important in return. For example, in return for granting amnesty South
Africa received a disclosure of the truth157 and at least a limited amount of retribution for the
victims.158 The victims need to be made whole in some sense. According to Judge Thomas
Burgenthal of the International Court of Justice, victims of human rights abuses often want
perpetrators to simply tell the truth, admit their guilt, and say they are sorry.159 His work with
the El Salvador Truth Commission highlighted that fact for him. Judge Burgenthal’s point is that
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one cannot discount how much discovering the truth, and having the perpetrators admit what
they did, can benefit the victims.
Another valuable benefit for the granting state in the context of internal armed conflict is
the cessation of hostilities. As previously stated, amnesty only for the national crime of taking
up arms against the government probably does not violate international law.160

In fact,

international law may encourage it.161 As a result, a state can “swap amnesty for peace” to
prevent further bloodshed,162 thereby perhaps sacrificing justice to ensure peace.163 If the state
grants a group immunity to stop a civil conflict, that group should not only lay down its arms, but
also give assurances that it will not return to fighting the government.
5. There should still be some retribution for the victims and truth finding.
Every society has an “inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the
motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed” so that they might
prevent such crimes in the future.164 Furthermore, the victims and their families are entitled to
know the truth about what happened before there can be national reconciliation.165 This does not
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mean, however, that the government must provide the victims a judicial remedy.166 Merely, the
government must simply implement some sort of investigative proceedings.167
A major reason many view the South African amnesties as a success is that the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission served a retributive function by tarnishing and humiliating the
perpetrators.168 Moreover, South Africa offered amnesty only in exchange for those responsible
giving a full disclosure of the facts.169 The victims, then, had at least a limited closure to the
atrocities of Apartheid. Without such truth findings, it is seldom possible to have any national
reconciliation, particularly after a bloody internal armed conflict.170
6. There can be no amnesty or pardon for genocide.
Regardless of the five foregoing criteria, there are certain crimes for which the world
community cannot ever sanction impunity. The horrible atrocities of World War II made it
essential to prosecute the gravest crimes.171 Genocide is the gravest of crimes, or “crime of
crimes.”172 Other courts, such as the Rwanda Tribunal, reserve the most serious punishment for
those guilty of genocide.173
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Since World War II, the U.N. has “consistently maintained that amnesty cannot be
granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or other
serious violations of international humanitarian law.”174 The prohibition of genocide has risen to
the level of customary international law.175 Moreover, the prohibition of genocide is an erga
omnes obligation, flowing to all states.176 Since the entire international community has an
interest in preventing crimes as horrible as genocide, all states must prevent it whenever
possible.177
In a landmark decision, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that any
impunity provisions designed to eliminate the responsibility for violations of non-derogable
human rights law are inadmissible.178 Courts cannot give effect to such provisions because they
prevent the investigation into, and punishment of the most serious human rights abuses.179 Even
though the Barrios Altos Case did not specifically enumerate genocide, or discuss international
crimes in general, it has greatly influenced domestic courts faced with amnesties.180 Domestic
courts in countries such as Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina are now following the lead of
international institutions and restricting the scope of amnesty provisions, holding that amnesty is
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inapplicable for serious human rights violations.181 Moreover, the Inter-American Court has
ruled that states have a duty to prevent and punish violations of human rights, even if private
actors carry out those violations.182 Thus, not only does the Inter-American Court prohibit
amnesties for serious human rights violations, it also creates an affirmative duty to punish
offenders thereof.
There is a universal duty to prevent and punish genocide.183 Given this duty to prevent
and punish genocide, there cannot be a valid pardon or amnesty for that crime. The Genocide
Convention “provides an absolute obligation to prosecute persons responsible for genocide.”184
The UN Human Rights Commission has also concluded that states have a duty to prosecute and
punish people responsible for serious international law crimes in general.185 Allowing a pardon
for genocide, then, would be contrary to the Genocide Convention because a pardon absolves a
criminal of his sentence,186 thus violating a state’s duty to punish that criminal. Even assuming
that the requirement to punish those responsible for genocide does not necessarily refer to
criminal prosecutions, states at least have a duty to ensure that any wronged party has available
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civil or other remedies to redress the situation.187 It seems clear, though, that states have an
affirmative duty to prosecute perpetrators of genocide.
F. The Criteria Applied to Ieng Sary.
Those arguing that Ieng Sary’s pardon and amnesty should not stand may rely on the
Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) precedent.188 In order to facilitate the peace process, the
government of Sierra Leone granted blanket immunity to rebels from various groups in conflict
with the government.189 Despite that fact, the SCSL decided that no previous amnesty would be
a bar to the prosecution of anyone falling under its jurisdiction.190 The Sierra Leone precedent
lends significant support to those arguing that immunity for serious human rights violations is
not valid. Even though the government willingly granted pardons and amnesties to end the
hostilities, the U.N. and the SCSL concluded that impunity was not in the best interest of the
people of Sierra Leone and decided not to give effect to any amnesty or pardon previously given.
Similarly, the ICJ noted in the Yerodia Case that a domestic amnesty is valid in the state where it
is granted, unless that state decides otherwise.191 That is, a domestic amnesty or pardon should
be valid in the state that gives that immunity unless the state decides it should not be effective.
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Therefore, just as a government can give a pardon or an amnesty, a government can legally take
one away as well.
Those arguing that Ieng Sary’s pardon and amnesty should stand will argue that the King
made the decision and members of the government have supported it. For example, Hun Sen,
the Cambodian Prime Minister, has expressed his opinion that retrying Ieng Sary would be
unfair.192 Furthermore, a second trial for the same crime would subject Sary to double jeopardy,
which is contrary to international law.193 The memorandum will discuss the specifics of a
possible double jeopardy defense more fully below. What follows is an analysis of the six
criteria specific to Ieng Sary.
1. Individuality: King Sihanouk issued the Royal Decree to Ieng Sary only.
The King issued the Royal Decree to Ieng Sary only.194 Therefore, the King tailored the
pardon and amnesty provisions contained in the Royal Decree specifically to Ieng Sary and the
facts of his situation. Since the King gave the pardon and amnesty to Ieng Sary individually, the
problems inherent in wholesale provisions of this kind do not exist. Thus, Sary’s pardon and
amnesty satisfy this factor.
2. Legislative approval: King Sihanouk unilaterally issued the Royal Decree
King Sihanouk signed the Royal Decree, and an official close to the King made it public
before Parliament approved it.195 Even though parliamentary approval is not a legal requirement
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for a royal decree of this nature, the fact that the King can unilaterally issue a pardon minimizes
the legitimacy of a pardon granted in a parliamentary system.196 It most likely also detracts from
the legitimacy of the parliamentary system itself in Cambodia. More importantly, the King
himself insisted that he did not believe the Royal Decree should be effective, or made public,
until two-thirds of Parliament approved it.197 Therefore, the Royal Decree does not satisfy this
criterion because the fact that the Royal Decree took legal effect before the Parliament voted on
it, indicating that Parliament had no power or authority to vote on Sary’s pardon and amnesty.
3. No self-granting: Ieng Sary did not give himself the pardon or amnesty.
Ieng Sary did not issue the Royal Decree, King Sihanouk did.198 Consequently, Sary’s
pardon and amnesty both satisfy this criterion.
4. Benefit to Cambodia: the pardon did not tangibly benefit the Cambodian
government or its people, but the amnesty did.
The pardon brought with it no tangible benefit for the Cambodian people. Ieng Sary did
not tell the truth about his crimes or admit guilt in exchange for the pardon. There is some
suggestion that King Sihanouk pardoned Sary in exchange for Sary leading a mass exodus of
lower-level Khmer Rouge partisans.199 Leading others to cease hostilities against a government
does not constitute a legitimate benefit to the people in exchange for impunity for possibly
committing genocide. There is nothing Sary could give, even a full disclosure of the truth, which
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would create a benefit great enough to the Cambodian people to give him immunity from a
genocide charge. Thus, the pardon portion of the Royal Decree does not satisfy this requirement.
The amnesty, however, does satisfy this factor because Cambodia received something in
return for it. Ieng Sary remained a member of the Democratic Kampuchea Group, the Khmer
Rouge, until 1996.200 King Sihanouk promulgated the Royal Decree on September 14, 1996,201
so the Cambodian people received the benefit of Ieng Sary leaving the Khmer Rouge. Moreover,
Ieng Sary led thousands of subordinates to surrender and leave the Khmer Rouge.202 Thus, in
exchange for the amnesty Ieng Sary not only ceased to be a member of the Khmer Rouge, but
also led many others to do the same.
5. Truth telling and retribution: allowing the pardon prohibits truth finding and
retribution for the victims.
The pardon also does not satisfy this standard. One of the major considerations regarding
the Khmer Rouge atrocities is that the Extraordinary Chambers is probably the Cambodian
people’s only avenue for redress. The alternative to prosecution in the Extraordinary Chambers
for Ieng Sary and others is likely impunity.203 As discussed above, the international community
does not recognize Sary’s 1979 trial as legitimate, so it has limited value in the fact-finding
sense. Moreover, unlike an appearance before a truth and reconciliation commission, Sary’s
previous trial produced no admission of wrongdoing or apology to the victims. Consequently,
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allowing the pardon to stand would not serve the Cambodian interests of finding the truth about,
and seeking retribution for the terrible atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.
On the other hand, the amnesty does meet the requirements to satisfy this criterion.
There is no denying that Sary was a member of the Khmer Rouge. He was the Deputy Prime
Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs under Pol Pot.204 A trial seeking to prove he was a member
of the Democratic Kampuchea Group would not serve any additional truth seeking function,
because the Cambodian people know the truth. Similarly, the victims of the atrocities would not
get much retribution by convicting Sary for being part of the Democratic Kampuchea Group.
More likely, the victims want Sary to pay for the actions taken by the Democratic Kampuchea
Group, rather than have him pay for simply being part of the group. Thus, even though the
amnesty deprives the victims of some retribution, it is minimal.
6. No impunity for serious international offences: the King pardoned Ieng Sary for
genocide.
The PRT tried and convicted Ieng Sary for genocide.205 Regardless of the fairness of that
trial, the Royal Decree pardoned Sary for genocide. Hence, that pardon cannot have legal effect,
because there can be no pardon or amnesty for genocide.206 The pardon portion of the Royal
Decree violates this factor.
The amnesty provision, however, does not suffer from the same problem. The amnesty
portion of the Royal Decree does not cover genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In
fact, the amnesty deals only with a violation of Cambodian national law. Thus, the amnesty
provision satisfies this criterion.
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7. Criteria conclusion
The pardon portion of the Royal Decree satisfies only two of the six criteria. Even if it
satisfied more, Ieng Sary’s pardon cannot be legally valid because it is for genocide. The pardon
violates the one criterion from which there can be no derogation. Therefore, a totality of the
circumstances test is obviated.
The amnesty provision is a much closer call. Just like the pardon, the King granted the
amnesty to Sary only, it was not self-given, and the people and government of Cambodia
received a benefit for granting it. Moreover, the amnesty does not prevent the people of
Cambodia from discovering the truth about the offense and it does not cover genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity. The major shortcomings are that the amnesty denies the
Cambodian people some retribution and that the legislature did not vote to approve it. That the
democratically elected legislature did not approve the amnesty is troubling, but is offset because
being a member of the Democratic Kampuchea Group is not a serious international crime. Thus,
under a totality of the circumstances view, the amnesty satisfies most of the criteria and the
Extraordinary Chambers should probably honor it.
G. The double jeopardy argument
Ieng Sary will likely argue207 that prosecuting him would violate the rule against double
jeopardy.208 The ICCPR, however, contemplates that, for this rule to be operative, the first trial
must take place in accordance with the applicable standards of international law and
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procedure.209 Moreover, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has inserted exceptions to the
double jeopardy prohibition in cases where the domestic trial did not conform to the “norms of
due process recognized by international law.”210 The language of that article indicates that the
drafters of the ICC Statute considered trials invalid for failure to observe due process when the
defendant is either convicted or acquitted.211 Applying that logic to this case, Sary’s previous
trial most likely did not constitute a valid trial entitling him to use the defense of double
jeopardy.
Certainly, the ICC analogy is not directly on point. The ICC is a purely international
court having no ties to the hypothetical court that did not observe due process or was not
impartial. That is, the ICC does not have the same legal ties to the population that a domestic
court does. The Extraordinary Chambers, however, is a hybrid domestic/international court with
significant ties to the Cambodian populace, and the PRT was a domestic court. As a result, the
concerns about double jeopardy are possibly more relevant in Ieng Sary’s case than in a potential
ICC case.

If the Extraordinary Chambers chooses to try Sary again for genocide it will,

generally, be subjecting him to prosecution for a charge against which he already received a final
judgment.212 One must ask, then, that in light of the circumstances surrounding Sary’s 1979 trial
before the PRT and the 1996 pardon, is it fair to subject Sary to prosecution for the second time
for the crime of genocide? The author concludes that a second trial would indeed be fair.

209

Id.

210

ICC Statute, Article 20(3)(b) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

211

Id. at Article 20(1).

212

ICCPR, Article 14(7) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

44

Retrying Sary for genocide may not even amount to double jeopardy. The PRT used a
definition of genocide that is vastly different from the prevailing international definition.213
While the 1979 charge is, in name, the same as a possible 2006 charge – both are for genocide –
the actual content of those charges is quite different. The Extraordinary Chambers will use the
prevailing international definition of genocide, not the definition the PRT used to convict Sary in
1979. Consequently, one may argue that trying Ieng Sary for genocide a second time would not
violate his right against double jeopardy because it would not be a trial for the same crime.
H. The Pardon
Let us assume for a moment that the pardon satisfies the criteria; can the Extraordinary
Chambers still disregard it and retry Ieng Sary for genocide?

Neither the U.N., nor the

international community as a whole, recognized the Vietnamese-installed government as the
legitimate government of Cambodia.214 The argument follows that, because Sary’s trial and
conviction were not valid, the pardon for that trial and conviction has no operative legal effect.215
If the pardon has no operative legal effect, the Extraordinary Chambers can disregard it and
fairly try Sary again in accordance with his due process rights. Thus, even if the pardon was a
valid exercise of King Sihanouk’s executive power, one could see it as more a curative measure
than having a legal effect. That is, the pardon served to correct the harm of the 1979 trial and not
to absolve Ieng Sary from facing punishment for his crimes.
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I. The Amnesty
Analyzing the amnesty provision under the criteria, this memorandum concludes that the
amnesty is valid and should have legal effect. The amnesty has a severely limited scope. The
language of the Royal Decree immunizes Sary only from prosecution under the Law to Outlaw
the Democratic Kampuchea Group,216 or for being a member of the Khmer Rouge. As a result,
the amnesty provision is for one specific crime only, and does not apply to the charges of
genocide or other crimes such as murder.217
J. The Extraordinary Chambers can disregard the pardon and the amnesty if it is an
international tribunal.
To the extent that the Extraordinary Chambers considers itself as an international
tribunal, the courts in both the Yerodia Case,218 and the Furundzija Case219 recognized that it is
impossible to invoke effectively an immunity created under national law in an international
tribunal. Thus, even though the amnesty portion of the Royal Decree passes the criteria, if the
Extraordinary Chambers views itself as an international tribunal, it can limit or choose to
disregard entirely the amnesty provision.
K. Alternatives to prosecution for genocide
Let us assume that the pardon is legally valid; does Ieng Sary completely escape a
criminal trial? The Extraordinary Chambers does not have to prosecute Ieng Sary for genocide.
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It can charge and try Sary for other crimes.220 In addition to genocide, the Extraordinary
Chambers has jurisdiction over crimes falling under the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956 (“Penal
Code”), crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, murder,
and others.221 Furthermore, the Penal Code allows for prosecution for attempt,222 accomplice
liability,223 and incitement224 for crimes such as murder. The Extraordinary Chambers may also
prosecute Sary for attempt to commit genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide225 instead of
prosecuting him for the actual completed crime.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Immunity provisions have been around for a long time. Pardons are backward looking,

after a court convicts a perpetrator. Amnesties, on the other hand, are forward looking and
granted before any court has tried an accused for possible crimes. Whether dealing with a
pardon or an amnesty, one cannot escape the realization that either type of immunity provision
shields an accused from punishment.
Immunity provisions arise under two different circumstances that are relevant to this
memorandum. First, there are amnesties and pardons for participating in armed conflict against
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the government. These types of immunity provisions are legitimate in some circumstances, and
may even be encouraged to promote peace and stability in a transitional government. They also
have numerous successful historical examples.
criminals for violating human rights.
significant scrutiny in recent years.

Second, governments sometimes immunize

Impunity for human rights abuses has come under
Often, such immunity is self-given.

As a result, a

prohibition of immunity for these serious human rights violations, particularly genocide, has
crystallized in international law.
This memorandum began with the task of attempting to determine the criteria the
Extraordinary Chambers should use to determine the validity and scope of King Sihanouk’s
Royal Decree, pardoning Ieng Sary for genocide, and giving him amnesty from prosecution
under the Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group.226 The memorandum developed
six universal criteria for decision-makers to apply to determine the validity of an amnesty or
pardon in international law. The criteria are specifically tailored for analyzing the legitimacy of
immunity provisions for more serious crimes and do not necessarily apply to lesser offenses,
although they might.
The Extraordinary Chambers should utilize a totality of the circumstances approach when
analyzing a specific situation with the six criteria. Those criteria are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

226
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a democratically elected legislature should vote on and approve an
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(6)

there cannot ever be an amnesty/pardon for genocide, war crimes, or crime
against humanity.

The memorandum examined both parts of the Royal Decree, the pardon and the amnesty, using
the above criteria as a guide. Under that analysis, this memorandum concludes that the pardon
falls short of international law standards and the Extraordinary Chambers should disregard it. It
fails the one non-derogable factor because it covers genocide, for which there can be no amnesty.
In contrast, this memorandum concludes that the amnesty is valid under a totality of the
circumstances analysis. Even though the people did not ratify it, the amnesty provision satisfies
the other criteria. The one arguable factor is whether the amnesty prevents the discovery of the
truth or curbs society’s legitimate need for reprisal for serious crimes. Prosecuting Ieng Sary for
being a member of the Democratic Kampuchea Group, however, would not lead to a robust
finding of facts because the Cambodians know about Sary’s involvement with the group, and the
crimes the group committed. What the Cambodian people need to discover is Ieng Sary’s
specific involvement in those crimes. Therefore, prosecuting Ieng Sary for being a part of the
Khmer Rouge also would not provide the Cambodians with the proper retribution, especially if
he is guilty of serious human rights violations.
Ieng Sary may have been a party to some of the worst human rights violations in history.
The ultimate question then becomes, will he ever have to stand trial before a legitimate tribunal
to discover his role in the Cambodian atrocities? Based on the foregoing legal analysis, Ieng
Sary should stand trial before the Extraordinary Chambers so that the people of Cambodia can
learn the truth about the Khmer Rouge and, if proper, punish one of the leaders of that group that
ravaged their country from April 17, 1975 until January 7, 1979.
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